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TALKING POINTS TO USE

1. The proposed Intelligence Community Planning System is thorough and ordinarily it would, no doubt, be well received by such Executive managerial organizations as OMB and by such oversight bodies as the House Appropriations Committee. The system, nevertheless, presents the NI staff with a dilemma. On the one hand, the principle that substance governs requirements and priorities is a good one and should be observed. For the NI staff, on the other hand, to monitor and contribute to the planning system would overtax its limited resources and divert its limited energies from its other, probably more important, missions. There exists, at the same time, no national-level organization other than the NI staff to provide the substantive contribution and supervision that the proposed planning system requires. We regard, therefore, the proposed system as a worthy undertaking that must be pared down to manageable proportions.

2. In the current element of the system, we do not agree that there is a need for a Current Outlook sub-element.

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To convey really useful information to program managers, a Current Outlook section would have to be a compendium of the principal current concerns of the National Security Council and its staff. To put such information altogether in one document would violate the need-to-know principle essential to the security of the policymaking process, as well as of the intelligence process, and thus would invite policymakers to exclude the Intelligence Community from the councils where policy is made and where the DCI's representatives must sit if the Intelligence Community is to make a relevant contribution. If, on the other hand, the Current Outlook section is envisioned as an annual state-of-the-world report, the State Department and NSC staff already do reports that would be of far more value than anything the NI staff or DDI could produce with the resources at their disposal.

3. We agree that requirements categories and associated priorities are useful, and we will review the work of the ad hoc DCID 1/2 working group.

4. We further agree to produce national intelligence requirements worldwide. The NI staff would not, on the other hand, participate in any attempt at an evaluation of the Intelligence Community's effort on the basis of these

requirements, beyond validating the results of the IC Staff's findings.

5. Salient Questions (and SQ strategy reports) will continue to be produced by the NI staff. In view of the added planning workload being taken on by the NI staff, the staff will not be able to participate in the evaluation process except to validate whether a Salient Question should be carried over, amended, or eliminated from one year to another.

6. Goals and Objectives, though they have existed for some time, should be eliminated. The Intelligence Community will shortly be using zero-based budgeting, a management system that essentially duplicates management-by-objectives. An organization can use both systems, but only at the cost of efficiency and with a fair amount of added effort. Goals and Objectives would not be cost-effective.

7. We rather like the new mid-range element of the planning system. We assume that the Perspectives contributed by the NI staff would be reduced essentially to an estimate of which countries and subjects are most likely to be of interest to policymakers and to the Intelligence Community within the planning and programming period. We also like the idea of

an Intelligence Strategy that would focus on the likely operating environment of intelligence collectors, processors, and analysts in the years ahead and on a drawing of the resource implications from the anticipated changed environment. We question, nevertheless, the need for Projected Changes in US Priorities in the Mid-Range Period. Anticipating changes in priorities has most significance for programming in the out years (three to eight years in the future) and not for making changes in the DCID 1/2 matrix which, under the new system, can be changed at any time. We do not see a role for the NI staff in the mid-range element beyond writing the Perspectives and validating the Strategy.

9. As for the long-range element, we continue to have basic reservations about spending scarce resources on a project so little likely to provide results of practical use. The NI staff would not be prepared to participate (or alternatively, the NI staff would only be prepared to put the project out on contract).

10. On reflection, we withdraw our previous agreement to the establishment of a DCI Planning Committee. The IC Staff is already a DCI committee for planning and management. More to the point, planning, if it is to be effective, must be done by line managers themselves. Professional planners

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must be facilitators who acquaint and assist managers with the mechanics of the process. To elevate planning -- by organizing the planners in a DCI committee with the same standing as those for collectors and producers of intelligence -- would be to give planning an altogether unwarranted status. Worse, it might well create a group with a vested interest in the processes of planning, rather than in the results that the planning process must produce to be of value.

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

3 February 1977

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1. Attached is proposal for the Intelligence Community planning system -- you recall he briefed you with viewgraphs on an earlier version. The system he now proposes is even more elaborate than what he had done. It does have worldwide national intelligence requirements as you envisioned them, and has KIQs.

2. A number of questions come to mind. The first is, do we really need a planning system that is this elaborate? For operational purposes the answer is obviously no. But the answer could be yes if the next DCI would see such a system as a mechanism for gaining greater control over the whole Community or if he thought such a system useful in his relations with OMB, Congress, etc.

3. The second question is whether the system would be properly focused. What I have in mind here is that the planning documents for mid- and long-range planning should be focused primarily on the operational environment of collectors and not on the likely substantive concerns of analysts. One cannot tell from the General's proposal whether he has thought this through. The big question, of course, is whether the IC Staff is about to capture too much of the NI staff's time. It looks to me as though the NIOs would be expected to do a worldwide current outlook, national intelligence requirements, KIQs and KIQ strategy reports, Perspectives, and perhaps global scenarios. This is clearly excessive. If the NI staff does not play the game, however, it does not stretch the imagination to posit that the IC Staff would soon attempt to form a group of substantively qualified people to do what they want the NIOs to do. This may be even more undesirable.



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25X1 4. If one goes along with all of this, is a new DCI committee the proper body to lead the effort? The attached draft DCID is written in a way that you could not chair it without being drawn into the IC Staff's bureaucratic maze and, by implication at least, subordinate [redacted] I doubt, in addition, that you would wish to spend as much of your time as would be required to supervise a planning mechanism. An alternative would be for you to attempt to capture the Office of Policy and Planning from the IC Staff and attach it to your own. A good argument could be made that the primary business of this division is substantively based and, therefore, belongs to you. The third alternative -- and the one clearly intended -- is that [redacted] chair the new DCI committee and God help us all. 25X1

25X1 5. [redacted] would like to talk to you and me on Friday or Monday; the attached document is due for submission to NFIB on Tuesday the 8th. They would settle for talking to me, but it strikes me that some fairly serious issues are involved here even should you decide only to attempt to delay this particular proposal until after we have a new DCI.

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